The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Malgré leurs avantages en matière d'utilisation par rapport aux systèmes d'authentification traditionnels, les systèmes d'authentification basés sur la biométrie souffrent de problèmes inhérents de violation de la vie privée et de non-révocabilité. Afin de résoudre ces problèmes, le concept de biométrie annulable a été introduit comme moyen de générer des identités multiples, révocables et non inversibles à partir de véritables modèles biométriques. Outre le BioHashing, qui est une technique biométrique annulable à deux facteurs basée sur le mélange d'un ensemble de nombres aléatoires tokenisés spécifiques à l'utilisateur avec des caractéristiques biométriques, les techniques biométriques annulables ne peuvent généralement pas préserver la précision de reconnaissance obtenue à l'aide des systèmes biométriques non protégés. Cependant, comme le jeton utilisé peut être perdu, partagé ou volé, BioHashing souffre des mêmes problèmes associés aux systèmes d'authentification basés sur les jetons. Dans cet article, un schéma biométrique fiable et annulable sans jeton, appelé BioEncoding, pour protéger les IrisCodes est présenté. Contrairement à BioHashing, BioEncoding peut être utilisé comme un système d'authentification à un facteur qui repose uniquement sur les seuls IrisCodes. Une chaîne de bits compacte non inversible unique, appelée BioCode, est dérivée de manière aléatoire d'un véritable IrisCode. Plutôt que le véritable IrisCode, le BioCode dérivé peut être utilisé efficacement pour vérifier l'identité de l'utilisateur sans dégrader la précision de reconnaissance obtenue à l'aide des IrisCodes originaux. De plus, BioEncoding satisfait à toutes les exigences de la construction biométrique annulable. Les performances de BioEncoding sont comparées aux performances de BioHashing dans le scénario de jeton volé et les résultats expérimentaux montrent la supériorité de la méthode proposée sur les techniques basées sur BioHashing.
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Osama OUDA, Norimichi TSUMURA, Toshiya NAKAGUCHI, "BioEncoding: A Reliable Tokenless Cancelable Biometrics Scheme for Protecting IrisCodes" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E93-D, no. 7, pp. 1878-1888, July 2010, doi: 10.1587/transinf.E93.D.1878.
Abstract: Despite their usability advantages over traditional authentication systems, biometrics-based authentication systems suffer from inherent privacy violation and non-revocability issues. In order to address these issues, the concept of cancelable biometrics was introduced as a means of generating multiple, revocable, and noninvertible identities from true biometric templates. Apart from BioHashing, which is a two-factor cancelable biometrics technique based on mixing a set of tokenized user-specific random numbers with biometric features, cancelable biometrics techniques usually cannot preserve the recognition accuracy achieved using the unprotected biometric systems. However, as the employed token can be lost, shared, or stolen, BioHashing suffers from the same issues associated with token-based authentication systems. In this paper, a reliable tokenless cancelable biometrics scheme, referred to as BioEncoding, for protecting IrisCodes is presented. Unlike BioHashing, BioEncoding can be used as a one-factor authentication scheme that relies only on sole IrisCodes. A unique noninvertible compact bit-string, referred to as BioCode, is randomly derived from a true IrisCode. Rather than the true IrisCode, the derived BioCode can be used efficiently to verify the user identity without degrading the recognition accuracy obtained using original IrisCodes. Additionally, BioEncoding satisfies all the requirements of the cancelable biometrics construct. The performance of BioEncoding is compared with the performance of BioHashing in the stolen-token scenario and the experimental results show the superiority of the proposed method over BioHashing-based techniques.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.E93.D.1878/_p
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@ARTICLE{e93-d_7_1878,
author={Osama OUDA, Norimichi TSUMURA, Toshiya NAKAGUCHI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={BioEncoding: A Reliable Tokenless Cancelable Biometrics Scheme for Protecting IrisCodes},
year={2010},
volume={E93-D},
number={7},
pages={1878-1888},
abstract={Despite their usability advantages over traditional authentication systems, biometrics-based authentication systems suffer from inherent privacy violation and non-revocability issues. In order to address these issues, the concept of cancelable biometrics was introduced as a means of generating multiple, revocable, and noninvertible identities from true biometric templates. Apart from BioHashing, which is a two-factor cancelable biometrics technique based on mixing a set of tokenized user-specific random numbers with biometric features, cancelable biometrics techniques usually cannot preserve the recognition accuracy achieved using the unprotected biometric systems. However, as the employed token can be lost, shared, or stolen, BioHashing suffers from the same issues associated with token-based authentication systems. In this paper, a reliable tokenless cancelable biometrics scheme, referred to as BioEncoding, for protecting IrisCodes is presented. Unlike BioHashing, BioEncoding can be used as a one-factor authentication scheme that relies only on sole IrisCodes. A unique noninvertible compact bit-string, referred to as BioCode, is randomly derived from a true IrisCode. Rather than the true IrisCode, the derived BioCode can be used efficiently to verify the user identity without degrading the recognition accuracy obtained using original IrisCodes. Additionally, BioEncoding satisfies all the requirements of the cancelable biometrics construct. The performance of BioEncoding is compared with the performance of BioHashing in the stolen-token scenario and the experimental results show the superiority of the proposed method over BioHashing-based techniques.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.E93.D.1878},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={July},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - BioEncoding: A Reliable Tokenless Cancelable Biometrics Scheme for Protecting IrisCodes
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 1878
EP - 1888
AU - Osama OUDA
AU - Norimichi TSUMURA
AU - Toshiya NAKAGUCHI
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transinf.E93.D.1878
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E93-D
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - July 2010
AB - Despite their usability advantages over traditional authentication systems, biometrics-based authentication systems suffer from inherent privacy violation and non-revocability issues. In order to address these issues, the concept of cancelable biometrics was introduced as a means of generating multiple, revocable, and noninvertible identities from true biometric templates. Apart from BioHashing, which is a two-factor cancelable biometrics technique based on mixing a set of tokenized user-specific random numbers with biometric features, cancelable biometrics techniques usually cannot preserve the recognition accuracy achieved using the unprotected biometric systems. However, as the employed token can be lost, shared, or stolen, BioHashing suffers from the same issues associated with token-based authentication systems. In this paper, a reliable tokenless cancelable biometrics scheme, referred to as BioEncoding, for protecting IrisCodes is presented. Unlike BioHashing, BioEncoding can be used as a one-factor authentication scheme that relies only on sole IrisCodes. A unique noninvertible compact bit-string, referred to as BioCode, is randomly derived from a true IrisCode. Rather than the true IrisCode, the derived BioCode can be used efficiently to verify the user identity without degrading the recognition accuracy obtained using original IrisCodes. Additionally, BioEncoding satisfies all the requirements of the cancelable biometrics construct. The performance of BioEncoding is compared with the performance of BioHashing in the stolen-token scenario and the experimental results show the superiority of the proposed method over BioHashing-based techniques.
ER -