The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Cet article prend d’abord l’IoT comme exemple pour motiver l’élimination du point de confiance unique (SPOT) dans une PKI privée basée sur une autorité de certification. Il décrit ensuite une infrastructure distribuée d'émission de certificats à clé publique qui élimine le SPOT et sa limitation dérivée de la génération de clés de signature. Enfin, il propose une méthode pour remédier à ses limites par tous les émetteurs de certificats.
Shohei KAKEI
Nagoya Institute of Technology
Hiroaki SEKO
Nagoya Institute of Technology
Yoshiaki SHIRAISHI
Kobe University
Shoichi SAITO
Nagoya Institute of Technology
The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.
Copier
Shohei KAKEI, Hiroaki SEKO, Yoshiaki SHIRAISHI, Shoichi SAITO, "Design of Enclosing Signing Keys by All Issuers in Distributed Public Key Certificate-Issuing Infrastructure" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E106-D, no. 9, pp. 1495-1498, September 2023, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2022OFL0001.
Abstract: This paper first takes IoT as an example to provide the motivation for eliminating the single point of trust (SPOT) in a CA-based private PKI. It then describes a distributed public key certificate-issuing infrastructure that eliminates the SPOT and its limitation derived from generating signing keys. Finally, it proposes a method to address its limitation by all certificate issuers.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2022OFL0001/_p
Copier
@ARTICLE{e106-d_9_1495,
author={Shohei KAKEI, Hiroaki SEKO, Yoshiaki SHIRAISHI, Shoichi SAITO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Design of Enclosing Signing Keys by All Issuers in Distributed Public Key Certificate-Issuing Infrastructure},
year={2023},
volume={E106-D},
number={9},
pages={1495-1498},
abstract={This paper first takes IoT as an example to provide the motivation for eliminating the single point of trust (SPOT) in a CA-based private PKI. It then describes a distributed public key certificate-issuing infrastructure that eliminates the SPOT and its limitation derived from generating signing keys. Finally, it proposes a method to address its limitation by all certificate issuers.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2022OFL0001},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={September},}
Copier
TY - JOUR
TI - Design of Enclosing Signing Keys by All Issuers in Distributed Public Key Certificate-Issuing Infrastructure
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 1495
EP - 1498
AU - Shohei KAKEI
AU - Hiroaki SEKO
AU - Yoshiaki SHIRAISHI
AU - Shoichi SAITO
PY - 2023
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2022OFL0001
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E106-D
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - September 2023
AB - This paper first takes IoT as an example to provide the motivation for eliminating the single point of trust (SPOT) in a CA-based private PKI. It then describes a distributed public key certificate-issuing infrastructure that eliminates the SPOT and its limitation derived from generating signing keys. Finally, it proposes a method to address its limitation by all certificate issuers.
ER -