The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Dans cet article, nous proposons deux protocoles d'échange de clés authentifiés (AKE) et prouvons leur sécurité dans le modèle étendu de Canetti-Krawczyk. Le premier protocole, appelé NAXOS+, est obtenu en modifiant légèrement le protocole NAXOS proposé par LaMacchia, Lauter et Mityagin [15]. Nous prouvons sa sécurité sous l’hypothèse Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) en utilisant le test de la trappe introduit dans [6]. À la connaissance des auteurs, il s’agit du premier protocole AKE sécurisé sous l’hypothèse CDH dans le modèle eCK. Le deuxième protocole, appelé NETS, bénéficie d'une réduction de sécurité simple et stricte par rapport aux schémas existants, notamment HMQV et CMQV, sans utiliser le lemme de Forking. Étant donné que chaque session du protocole NETS ne nécessite que trois exponentiations par partie, son efficacité est également comparable à celle de MQV, HMQV et CMQV.
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Jooyoung LEE, Je Hong PARK, "Efficient and Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in the eCK Model" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E94-A, no. 1, pp. 129-138, January 2011, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.129.
Abstract: In this paper, we propose two authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocols and prove their security in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model. The first protocol, called NAXOS+, is obtained by slightly modifying the NAXOS protocol proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin [15]. We prove its security under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption by using the trapdoor test introduced in [6]. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first AKE protocol which is secure under the CDH assumption in the eCK model. The second protocol, called NETS, enjoys a simple and tight security reduction compared to existing schemes including HMQV and CMQV without using the Forking Lemma. Since each session of the NETS protocol requires only three exponentiations per party, its efficiency is also comparable to MQV, HMQV and CMQV.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E94.A.129/_p
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@ARTICLE{e94-a_1_129,
author={Jooyoung LEE, Je Hong PARK, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Efficient and Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in the eCK Model},
year={2011},
volume={E94-A},
number={1},
pages={129-138},
abstract={In this paper, we propose two authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocols and prove their security in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model. The first protocol, called NAXOS+, is obtained by slightly modifying the NAXOS protocol proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin [15]. We prove its security under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption by using the trapdoor test introduced in [6]. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first AKE protocol which is secure under the CDH assumption in the eCK model. The second protocol, called NETS, enjoys a simple and tight security reduction compared to existing schemes including HMQV and CMQV without using the Forking Lemma. Since each session of the NETS protocol requires only three exponentiations per party, its efficiency is also comparable to MQV, HMQV and CMQV.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E94.A.129},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
Copier
TY - JOUR
TI - Efficient and Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in the eCK Model
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 129
EP - 138
AU - Jooyoung LEE
AU - Je Hong PARK
PY - 2011
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.129
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E94-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2011
AB - In this paper, we propose two authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocols and prove their security in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model. The first protocol, called NAXOS+, is obtained by slightly modifying the NAXOS protocol proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin [15]. We prove its security under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption by using the trapdoor test introduced in [6]. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first AKE protocol which is secure under the CDH assumption in the eCK model. The second protocol, called NETS, enjoys a simple and tight security reduction compared to existing schemes including HMQV and CMQV without using the Forking Lemma. Since each session of the NETS protocol requires only three exponentiations per party, its efficiency is also comparable to MQV, HMQV and CMQV.
ER -