The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
En 2006, Tanaka a proposé une variante efficace du système de partage de clés non interactif basé sur l'identité de Maurer-Yacobi. Dans le schéma de Tanaka, la complexité informatique pour générer les informations secrètes de chaque utilisateur est bien inférieure à celle du schéma de Maurer-Yacobi. Le schéma de partage de clés original de Tanaka n'est pas complet et Tanaka a donc corrigé le schéma original pour assurer l'exhaustivité. Dans cet article, nous montrons que le schéma de partage de clés corrigé de Tanaka n'est pas protégé contre les attaques de collusion. Autrement dit, deux utilisateurs peuvent collaborer pour factoriser un module système avec leurs informations secrètes et ainsi rompre le schéma de partage de clés.
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Ik Rae JEONG, Jeong Ok KWON, Dong Hoon LEE, "Collusion Attacks to Tanaka's Corrected ID-Based Non-interactive Key Sharing Scheme" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 3, pp. 932-934, March 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.932.
Abstract: In 2006, Tanaka has proposed an efficient variant of Maurer-Yacobi's identity-based non-interactive key sharing scheme. In Tanaka's scheme, the computational complexity to generate each user's secret information is much smaller than that of Maurer-Yacobi's scheme. Tanaka's original key sharing scheme does not provide completeness, and so Tanaka has corrected the original scheme to provide completeness. In this paper, we show that Tanaka's corrected key sharing scheme is not secure against collusion attacks. That is, two users can collaborate to factorize a system modulus with their secret information and thus break the key sharing scheme.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.932/_p
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@ARTICLE{e92-a_3_932,
author={Ik Rae JEONG, Jeong Ok KWON, Dong Hoon LEE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Collusion Attacks to Tanaka's Corrected ID-Based Non-interactive Key Sharing Scheme},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={3},
pages={932-934},
abstract={In 2006, Tanaka has proposed an efficient variant of Maurer-Yacobi's identity-based non-interactive key sharing scheme. In Tanaka's scheme, the computational complexity to generate each user's secret information is much smaller than that of Maurer-Yacobi's scheme. Tanaka's original key sharing scheme does not provide completeness, and so Tanaka has corrected the original scheme to provide completeness. In this paper, we show that Tanaka's corrected key sharing scheme is not secure against collusion attacks. That is, two users can collaborate to factorize a system modulus with their secret information and thus break the key sharing scheme.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.932},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={March},}
Copier
TY - JOUR
TI - Collusion Attacks to Tanaka's Corrected ID-Based Non-interactive Key Sharing Scheme
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 932
EP - 934
AU - Ik Rae JEONG
AU - Jeong Ok KWON
AU - Dong Hoon LEE
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.932
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - March 2009
AB - In 2006, Tanaka has proposed an efficient variant of Maurer-Yacobi's identity-based non-interactive key sharing scheme. In Tanaka's scheme, the computational complexity to generate each user's secret information is much smaller than that of Maurer-Yacobi's scheme. Tanaka's original key sharing scheme does not provide completeness, and so Tanaka has corrected the original scheme to provide completeness. In this paper, we show that Tanaka's corrected key sharing scheme is not secure against collusion attacks. That is, two users can collaborate to factorize a system modulus with their secret information and thus break the key sharing scheme.
ER -