The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Nous proposons un schéma d'authentification dans lequel les utilisateurs peuvent être authentifiés de manière anonyme tant que le nombre de fois où ils sont authentifiés reste dans un nombre autorisé. Le système proposé présente deux caractéristiques : 1) personne, pas même une autorité, ne peut identifier les utilisateurs qui ont été authentifiés au-delà du nombre autorisé, 2) n'importe qui peut retrouver, sans l'aide de l'autorité, les utilisateurs malhonnêtes qui ont été authentifiés au-delà du nombre autorisé. numéro en utilisant les enregistrements de ces authentifications. Notre système peut être appliqué au vote électronique, à l'argent électronique, aux coupons électroniques et à la navigation d'essai de contenu. Dans ces applications, notre système, contrairement au précédent, dissimule la participation des utilisateurs aux protocoles et garantit qu'ils resteront anonymes pour tous.
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Isamu TERANISHI, Jun FURUKAWA, Kazue SAKO, "k-Times Anonymous Authentication" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E92-A, no. 1, pp. 147-165, January 2009, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.147.
Abstract: We propose an authentication scheme in which users can be authenticated anonymously so long as times that they are authenticated is within an allowable number. The proposed scheme has two features: 1) no one, not even an authority, can identify users who have been authenticated within the allowable number, 2) anyone can trace, without help from the authority, dishonest users who have been authenticated beyond the allowable number by using the records of these authentications. Our scheme can be applied to e-voting, e-cash, electronic coupons, and trial browsing of content. In these applications, our scheme, unlike the previous one, conceals users' participation from protocols and guarantees that they will remain anonymous to everyone.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E92.A.147/_p
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@ARTICLE{e92-a_1_147,
author={Isamu TERANISHI, Jun FURUKAWA, Kazue SAKO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={k-Times Anonymous Authentication},
year={2009},
volume={E92-A},
number={1},
pages={147-165},
abstract={We propose an authentication scheme in which users can be authenticated anonymously so long as times that they are authenticated is within an allowable number. The proposed scheme has two features: 1) no one, not even an authority, can identify users who have been authenticated within the allowable number, 2) anyone can trace, without help from the authority, dishonest users who have been authenticated beyond the allowable number by using the records of these authentications. Our scheme can be applied to e-voting, e-cash, electronic coupons, and trial browsing of content. In these applications, our scheme, unlike the previous one, conceals users' participation from protocols and guarantees that they will remain anonymous to everyone.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E92.A.147},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - k-Times Anonymous Authentication
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 147
EP - 165
AU - Isamu TERANISHI
AU - Jun FURUKAWA
AU - Kazue SAKO
PY - 2009
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E92.A.147
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E92-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2009
AB - We propose an authentication scheme in which users can be authenticated anonymously so long as times that they are authenticated is within an allowable number. The proposed scheme has two features: 1) no one, not even an authority, can identify users who have been authenticated within the allowable number, 2) anyone can trace, without help from the authority, dishonest users who have been authenticated beyond the allowable number by using the records of these authentications. Our scheme can be applied to e-voting, e-cash, electronic coupons, and trial browsing of content. In these applications, our scheme, unlike the previous one, conceals users' participation from protocols and guarantees that they will remain anonymous to everyone.
ER -