The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Les monnaies numériques des banques centrales nécessitent la mise en œuvre d'eKYC pour vérifier si un client commercial est éligible en ligne. Lorsqu'une organisation délivre une preuve d'identité d'un client pour eKYC, cette preuve est généralement obtenue en pratique par une hiérarchie d'émetteurs. Cependant, le client ne souhaite divulguer qu'une partie de la chaîne et des documents de l'émetteur au partenaire commercial pour des raisons de confidentialité. Dans cette recherche, les informations d'identification anonymes délégables (DAC) et la preuve de plage de connaissance nulle (ZKRP) permettent aux clients de modifier arbitrairement des parties de la chaîne de délégation et du corps du message pour des preuves de plage exprimées en inégalités. De cette façon, les clients peuvent protéger la confidentialité dont ils ont besoin avec leur propre contrôle. Une preuve sans connaissance est appliquée pour prouver l'inégalité entre deux horodatages par le serveur d'horodatage (présentation de la signature, révocation de la clé publique ou non-révocation) sans divulguer le contenu de la signature et l'heure estampillée. Il permet de prouver que les informations d'enregistrement de la carte nationale d'identité sont valides ou invalides tout en gardant anonymes les informations personnelles de l'utilisateur. Cette recherche vise à contribuer à la réalisation d'un système financier durable basé sur une gestion des identités auto-souveraine avec une PKI renforcée par la confidentialité.
Kazuo TAKARAGI
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
Takashi KUBOTA
Waseda Law School
Sven WOHLGEMUTH
SECOM Co., Ltd.
Katsuyuki UMEZAWA
Shonan Institute of Technology
Hiroki KOYANAGI
Shonan Institute of Technology
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Kazuo TAKARAGI, Takashi KUBOTA, Sven WOHLGEMUTH, Katsuyuki UMEZAWA, Hiroki KOYANAGI, "Secure Revocation Features in eKYC - Privacy Protection in Central Bank Digital Currency" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E106-A, no. 3, pp. 325-332, March 2023, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0008.
Abstract: Central bank digital currencies require the implementation of eKYC to verify whether a trading customer is eligible online. When an organization issues an ID proof of a customer for eKYC, that proof is usually achieved in practice by a hierarchy of issuers. However, the customer wants to disclose only part of the issuer's chain and documents to the trading partner due to privacy concerns. In this research, delegatable anonymous credential (DAC) and zero-knowledge range proof (ZKRP) allow customers to arbitrarily change parts of the delegation chain and message body to range proofs expressed in inequalities. That way, customers can protect the privacy they need with their own control. Zero-knowledge proof is applied to prove the inequality between two time stamps by the time stamp server (signature presentation, public key revocation, or non-revocation) without disclosing the signature content and stamped time. It makes it possible to prove that the registration information of the national ID card is valid or invalid while keeping the user's personal information anonymous. This research aims to contribute to the realization of a sustainable financial system based on self-sovereign identity management with privacy-enhanced PKI.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0008/_p
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@ARTICLE{e106-a_3_325,
author={Kazuo TAKARAGI, Takashi KUBOTA, Sven WOHLGEMUTH, Katsuyuki UMEZAWA, Hiroki KOYANAGI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Secure Revocation Features in eKYC - Privacy Protection in Central Bank Digital Currency},
year={2023},
volume={E106-A},
number={3},
pages={325-332},
abstract={Central bank digital currencies require the implementation of eKYC to verify whether a trading customer is eligible online. When an organization issues an ID proof of a customer for eKYC, that proof is usually achieved in practice by a hierarchy of issuers. However, the customer wants to disclose only part of the issuer's chain and documents to the trading partner due to privacy concerns. In this research, delegatable anonymous credential (DAC) and zero-knowledge range proof (ZKRP) allow customers to arbitrarily change parts of the delegation chain and message body to range proofs expressed in inequalities. That way, customers can protect the privacy they need with their own control. Zero-knowledge proof is applied to prove the inequality between two time stamps by the time stamp server (signature presentation, public key revocation, or non-revocation) without disclosing the signature content and stamped time. It makes it possible to prove that the registration information of the national ID card is valid or invalid while keeping the user's personal information anonymous. This research aims to contribute to the realization of a sustainable financial system based on self-sovereign identity management with privacy-enhanced PKI.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0008},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={March},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Secure Revocation Features in eKYC - Privacy Protection in Central Bank Digital Currency
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 325
EP - 332
AU - Kazuo TAKARAGI
AU - Takashi KUBOTA
AU - Sven WOHLGEMUTH
AU - Katsuyuki UMEZAWA
AU - Hiroki KOYANAGI
PY - 2023
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0008
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E106-A
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - March 2023
AB - Central bank digital currencies require the implementation of eKYC to verify whether a trading customer is eligible online. When an organization issues an ID proof of a customer for eKYC, that proof is usually achieved in practice by a hierarchy of issuers. However, the customer wants to disclose only part of the issuer's chain and documents to the trading partner due to privacy concerns. In this research, delegatable anonymous credential (DAC) and zero-knowledge range proof (ZKRP) allow customers to arbitrarily change parts of the delegation chain and message body to range proofs expressed in inequalities. That way, customers can protect the privacy they need with their own control. Zero-knowledge proof is applied to prove the inequality between two time stamps by the time stamp server (signature presentation, public key revocation, or non-revocation) without disclosing the signature content and stamped time. It makes it possible to prove that the registration information of the national ID card is valid or invalid while keeping the user's personal information anonymous. This research aims to contribute to the realization of a sustainable financial system based on self-sovereign identity management with privacy-enhanced PKI.
ER -