The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Dans cet article, nous explorons la sécurité contre les attaques intégrales sur les chiffrements de flux bien connus SNOW 3G et KCipher-2. SNOW 3G est au cœur des algorithmes de confidentialité et d'intégrité 3GPP UEA2 et UIA2, et KCipher-2 est un algorithme standard ISO/IEC 18033-4 et CRYPTREC. Plus précisément, nous étudions la propagation de la propriété de division dans SNOW 3G et KCipher-2 par la programmation linéaire à nombres entiers mixtes afin de trouver efficacement un distinguateur intégral. En conséquence, nous présentons un distinctif intégral à 7 tours avec 23 IV choisis pour KCipher-2. À notre connaissance, il s’agit de la première attaque contre une variante réduite de KCipher-2 par un tiers. De plus, nous présentons un distinctif intégral de 13 tours avec 27 IV choisis pour SNOW 3G, dont la complexité temps/données est la moitié de la meilleure attaque précédente de Biryukov et al.
Jin HOKI
University of Hyogo
Kosei SAKAMOTO
University of Hyogo
Kazuhiko MINEMATSU
NEC Corporation
Takanori ISOBE
University of Hyogo,National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
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Jin HOKI, Kosei SAKAMOTO, Kazuhiko MINEMATSU, Takanori ISOBE, "Practical Integral Distinguishers on SNOW 3G and KCipher-2" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E104-A, no. 11, pp. 1603-1611, November 2021, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2020EAP1102.
Abstract: In this paper, we explore the security against integral attacks on well-known stream ciphers SNOW 3G and KCipher-2. SNOW 3G is the core of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms UEA2 and UIA2, and KCipher-2 is a standard algorithm of ISO/IEC 18033-4 and CRYPTREC. Specifically, we investigate the propagation of the division property inside SNOW 3G and KCipher-2 by the Mixed-Integer Linear Programming to efficiently find an integral distinguisher. As a result, we present a 7-round integral distinguisher with 23 chosen IVs for KCipher-2. As far as we know, this is the first attack on a reduced variant of KCipher-2 by the third party. In addition, we present a 13-round integral distinguisher with 27 chosen IVs for SNOW 3G, whose time/data complexity is half of the previous best attack by Biryukov et al.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2020EAP1102/_p
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@ARTICLE{e104-a_11_1603,
author={Jin HOKI, Kosei SAKAMOTO, Kazuhiko MINEMATSU, Takanori ISOBE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Practical Integral Distinguishers on SNOW 3G and KCipher-2},
year={2021},
volume={E104-A},
number={11},
pages={1603-1611},
abstract={In this paper, we explore the security against integral attacks on well-known stream ciphers SNOW 3G and KCipher-2. SNOW 3G is the core of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms UEA2 and UIA2, and KCipher-2 is a standard algorithm of ISO/IEC 18033-4 and CRYPTREC. Specifically, we investigate the propagation of the division property inside SNOW 3G and KCipher-2 by the Mixed-Integer Linear Programming to efficiently find an integral distinguisher. As a result, we present a 7-round integral distinguisher with 23 chosen IVs for KCipher-2. As far as we know, this is the first attack on a reduced variant of KCipher-2 by the third party. In addition, we present a 13-round integral distinguisher with 27 chosen IVs for SNOW 3G, whose time/data complexity is half of the previous best attack by Biryukov et al.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2020EAP1102},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={November},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Practical Integral Distinguishers on SNOW 3G and KCipher-2
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1603
EP - 1611
AU - Jin HOKI
AU - Kosei SAKAMOTO
AU - Kazuhiko MINEMATSU
AU - Takanori ISOBE
PY - 2021
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2020EAP1102
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E104-A
IS - 11
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - November 2021
AB - In this paper, we explore the security against integral attacks on well-known stream ciphers SNOW 3G and KCipher-2. SNOW 3G is the core of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms UEA2 and UIA2, and KCipher-2 is a standard algorithm of ISO/IEC 18033-4 and CRYPTREC. Specifically, we investigate the propagation of the division property inside SNOW 3G and KCipher-2 by the Mixed-Integer Linear Programming to efficiently find an integral distinguisher. As a result, we present a 7-round integral distinguisher with 23 chosen IVs for KCipher-2. As far as we know, this is the first attack on a reduced variant of KCipher-2 by the third party. In addition, we present a 13-round integral distinguisher with 27 chosen IVs for SNOW 3G, whose time/data complexity is half of the previous best attack by Biryukov et al.
ER -