The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
De nombreux pays ont déréglementé leurs marchés de détail de l’électricité pour offrir des tarifs d’électricité moins élevés aux consommateurs. Toutefois, de nombreux consommateurs n'ont pas changé de fournisseur après la déréglementation, et les fournisseurs d'électricité n'ont pas tendance à réduire considérablement leurs tarifs. Cet article propose un modèle de marché de l'électricité et un jeu évolutif pour analyser le comportement des consommateurs sur les marchés de détail de l'électricité. Notre modèle se concentre sur les coûts de changement tels que l’effort de changement, les coûts liés à la recherche d’autres alternatives, etc. Le jeu évolutionniste examine si les consommateurs choisissent ou non une stratégie impliquant l’exploration de nouvelles alternatives avec les coûts de recherche en tant que « coopérateurs ». Les résultats de simulation démontrent que la part des coopérateurs n’a pas été améliorée en leur accordant simplement des récompenses en guise de compensation pour les coûts de recherche. En outre, les résultats suggèrent également que le degré de coopérateurs dans un réseau parmi les consommateurs joue un rôle essentiel dans l’augmentation de la part des coopérateurs et du taux de changement.
Ryo HASE
Soka University
Norihiko SHINOMIYA
Soka University
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Ryo HASE, Norihiko SHINOMIYA, "An Evolutionary Game for Analyzing Switching Behavior of Consumers in Electricity Retail Markets" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E103-A, no. 2, pp. 407-416, February 2020, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003.
Abstract: Many countries have deregulated their electricity retail markets to offer lower electricity charges to consumers. However, many consumers have not switched their suppliers after the deregulation, and electricity suppliers do not tend to reduce their charges intensely. This paper proposes an electricity market model and evolutionary game to analyze the behavior of consumers in electricity retail markets. Our model focuses on switching costs such as an effort at switching, costs in searching for other alternatives, and so on. The evolutionary game examines whether consumers choose a strategy involving exploration of new alternatives with the searching costs as “cooperators” or not. Simulation results demonstrate that the share of cooperators was not improved by simply giving rewards for cooperators as compensation for searching costs. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the degree of cooperators in a network among consumers has a vital role in increasing the share of cooperators and switching rate.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003/_p
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@ARTICLE{e103-a_2_407,
author={Ryo HASE, Norihiko SHINOMIYA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={An Evolutionary Game for Analyzing Switching Behavior of Consumers in Electricity Retail Markets},
year={2020},
volume={E103-A},
number={2},
pages={407-416},
abstract={Many countries have deregulated their electricity retail markets to offer lower electricity charges to consumers. However, many consumers have not switched their suppliers after the deregulation, and electricity suppliers do not tend to reduce their charges intensely. This paper proposes an electricity market model and evolutionary game to analyze the behavior of consumers in electricity retail markets. Our model focuses on switching costs such as an effort at switching, costs in searching for other alternatives, and so on. The evolutionary game examines whether consumers choose a strategy involving exploration of new alternatives with the searching costs as “cooperators” or not. Simulation results demonstrate that the share of cooperators was not improved by simply giving rewards for cooperators as compensation for searching costs. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the degree of cooperators in a network among consumers has a vital role in increasing the share of cooperators and switching rate.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={February},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - An Evolutionary Game for Analyzing Switching Behavior of Consumers in Electricity Retail Markets
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 407
EP - 416
AU - Ryo HASE
AU - Norihiko SHINOMIYA
PY - 2020
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E103-A
IS - 2
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - February 2020
AB - Many countries have deregulated their electricity retail markets to offer lower electricity charges to consumers. However, many consumers have not switched their suppliers after the deregulation, and electricity suppliers do not tend to reduce their charges intensely. This paper proposes an electricity market model and evolutionary game to analyze the behavior of consumers in electricity retail markets. Our model focuses on switching costs such as an effort at switching, costs in searching for other alternatives, and so on. The evolutionary game examines whether consumers choose a strategy involving exploration of new alternatives with the searching costs as “cooperators” or not. Simulation results demonstrate that the share of cooperators was not improved by simply giving rewards for cooperators as compensation for searching costs. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the degree of cooperators in a network among consumers has a vital role in increasing the share of cooperators and switching rate.
ER -