The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Cet article présente quelques nouveaux protocoles pour (M+1)enchère au premier prix, un style d'enchère dans lequel le prix le plus élevé M les enchérisseurs gagnent et paient un prix uniforme, déterminé par le (M+1)er prix. Un ensemble de serveurs distribués collabore pour résoudre le (M+1)er prix sans révéler aucune information en termes d'enchères y compris celles des gagnants. Une nouvelle astuce permettant de calculer conjointement et en toute sécurité la valeur la plus élevée en tant que degré de polynômes distribués est introduite. L'élément de base ne nécessite qu'un seul tour pour que les enchérisseurs fassent des offres et un tour pour que les commissaires-priseurs déterminent les gagnants.
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Hiroaki KIKUCHI, "(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E85-A, no. 3, pp. 676-683, March 2002, doi: .
Abstract: This paper presents some new protocols for (M+1)st-price auction, a style of auction in which the highest M bidders win and pay a uniform price, determined by the (M+1)st price. A set of distributed servers collaborates to resolve the (M+1)st price without revealing any information in terms of bids including the winners' bids. A new trick to jointly and securely compute the highest value as a degree of distributed polynomials is introduced. The building block requires just one round for bidders to cast bids and one round for auctioneers to determine the winners.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e85-a_3_676/_p
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@ARTICLE{e85-a_3_676,
author={Hiroaki KIKUCHI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol},
year={2002},
volume={E85-A},
number={3},
pages={676-683},
abstract={This paper presents some new protocols for (M+1)st-price auction, a style of auction in which the highest M bidders win and pay a uniform price, determined by the (M+1)st price. A set of distributed servers collaborates to resolve the (M+1)st price without revealing any information in terms of bids including the winners' bids. A new trick to jointly and securely compute the highest value as a degree of distributed polynomials is introduced. The building block requires just one round for bidders to cast bids and one round for auctioneers to determine the winners.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={March},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - (M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 676
EP - 683
AU - Hiroaki KIKUCHI
PY - 2002
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E85-A
IS - 3
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - March 2002
AB - This paper presents some new protocols for (M+1)st-price auction, a style of auction in which the highest M bidders win and pay a uniform price, determined by the (M+1)st price. A set of distributed servers collaborates to resolve the (M+1)st price without revealing any information in terms of bids including the winners' bids. A new trick to jointly and securely compute the highest value as a degree of distributed polynomials is introduced. The building block requires just one round for bidders to cast bids and one round for auctioneers to determine the winners.
ER -