The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Diverses attaques contre RC5 ont été analysées de manière approfondie. Il n'a pas été signalé qu'une attaque de texte en clair connue fonctionne à un niveau aussi élevé qu'une attaque de texte en clair choisie, mais elle peut fonctionner de manière plus efficace et plus pratique. Dans cet article, nous étudions une attaque connue contre RC5 en améliorant une attaque de corrélation. Quant à une attaque connue en clair contre RC5, le résultat le plus connu est une cryptanalyse linéaire. Ils ont rapporté que le RC5-32 avec 10 tours peut être brisé par 264 textes en clair sous l'hypothèse heuristique : RC5-32 avec r les tours peuvent être interrompus avec une probabilité de réussite de 90 % en utilisant 26r+4 textes en clair. Cependant, leur hypothèse semble très optimiste. Notre attaque connue par corrélation de texte en clair peut briser RC5-32 avec 10 tours (20 demi-tours) dans un sens plus strict avec une probabilité de réussite de 90 % en utilisant 263.67 textes en clair. De plus, notre attaque peut briser RC5-32 avec 21 demi-tours avec une probabilité de réussite de 30% en utilisant 263.07 textes en clair.
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Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, "Improved Correlation Attack on RC5" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E85-A, no. 1, pp. 44-57, January 2002, doi: .
Abstract: Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 264 plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 263.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 263.07 plaintexts.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e85-a_1_44/_p
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@ARTICLE{e85-a_1_44,
author={Atsuko MIYAJI, Masao NONAKA, Yoshinori TAKII, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Improved Correlation Attack on RC5},
year={2002},
volume={E85-A},
number={1},
pages={44-57},
abstract={Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 264 plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 263.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 263.07 plaintexts.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Improved Correlation Attack on RC5
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 44
EP - 57
AU - Atsuko MIYAJI
AU - Masao NONAKA
AU - Yoshinori TAKII
PY - 2002
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E85-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2002
AB - Various attacks against RC5 have been analyzed intensively. A known plaintext attack has not been reported that it works on so higher round as a chosen plaintext attack, but it can work more efficiently and practically. In this paper, we investigate a known plaintext attack against RC5 by improving a correlation attack. As for a known plaintext attack against RC5, the best known result is a linear cryptanalysis. They have reported that RC5-32 with 10 rounds can be broken by 264 plaintexts under the heuristic assumption: RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26r+4 plaintexts. However, their assumption seems to be highly optimistic. Our known plaintext correlation attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) in a more strict sense with a success probability of 90% by using 263.67 plaintexts. Furthermore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds in a success probability of 30% by using 263.07 plaintexts.
ER -