The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Cet article propose les premiers schémas multi-signatures dont la sécurité est prouvée sous le modèle Oracle aléatoire. La sécurité de nos systèmes peut être prouvée dans le sens de sécurité concrète dans la Réf. [13]. Les schémas proposés sont efficaces si l’oracle aléatoire est remplacé par des fonctions de hachage pratiques. Les techniques essentielles dans notre preuve de sécurité sont les réduction optimale de la rupture de l'identification correspondante à la rupture des signatures (Technique de réduction d'identification), et le lemmes hiérarchiques à lignes lourdes utilisé dans la réduction concrète de la résolution du problème primitif à la rupture du schéma d'identification.
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Kazuo OHTA, Tatsuaki OKAMOTO, "Multi-Signature Schemes Secure against Active Insider Attacks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E82-A, no. 1, pp. 21-31, January 1999, doi: .
Abstract: This paper proposes the first provably secure multi-signature schemes under the random oracle model. The security of our schemes can be proven in the sense of concrete security in Ref. [13]. The proposed schemes are efficient if the random oracle is replaced by practical hash functions. The essential techniques in our proof of security are the optimal reduction from breaking the corresponding identification to breaking signatures (ID Reduction Technique), and the hierarchical heavy row lemmas used in the concrete reduction from solving the primitive problem to breaking the identification scheme.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e82-a_1_21/_p
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@ARTICLE{e82-a_1_21,
author={Kazuo OHTA, Tatsuaki OKAMOTO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Multi-Signature Schemes Secure against Active Insider Attacks},
year={1999},
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number={1},
pages={21-31},
abstract={This paper proposes the first provably secure multi-signature schemes under the random oracle model. The security of our schemes can be proven in the sense of concrete security in Ref. [13]. The proposed schemes are efficient if the random oracle is replaced by practical hash functions. The essential techniques in our proof of security are the optimal reduction from breaking the corresponding identification to breaking signatures (ID Reduction Technique), and the hierarchical heavy row lemmas used in the concrete reduction from solving the primitive problem to breaking the identification scheme.},
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month={January},}
Copier
TY - JOUR
TI - Multi-Signature Schemes Secure against Active Insider Attacks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 21
EP - 31
AU - Kazuo OHTA
AU - Tatsuaki OKAMOTO
PY - 1999
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JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E82-A
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JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 1999
AB - This paper proposes the first provably secure multi-signature schemes under the random oracle model. The security of our schemes can be proven in the sense of concrete security in Ref. [13]. The proposed schemes are efficient if the random oracle is replaced by practical hash functions. The essential techniques in our proof of security are the optimal reduction from breaking the corresponding identification to breaking signatures (ID Reduction Technique), and the hierarchical heavy row lemmas used in the concrete reduction from solving the primitive problem to breaking the identification scheme.
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