The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Dans une population composée d'un grand nombre de joueurs interagissant les uns avec les autres, le gain de chaque joueur entre souvent en conflit avec le gain total de la population à laquelle il appartient. Dans une telle situation, un « gouvernement » doté d’une perspective globale est nécessaire pour gouverner la population. Récemment, pour discuter de la population avec le gouvernement, les auteurs ont proposé une dynamique de réplicateur avec réallocation des gains pour analyser un effet du gouvernement. Dans ce modèle, le gouvernement est disposé à conduire la population vers un état cible souhaitable en collectant une partie des gains des joueurs et en les réaffectant en fonction de l'état cible. L'action du gouvernement est le taux de collecte des gains auprès des joueurs et ce taux est supposé constant et indépendant de l'état de la population. Ainsi, dans cet article, nous supposons que le gouvernement change sa stratégie d'intervention en fonction de l'état actuel de la population. Nous considérons le gouvernement comme un acteur du jeu et définissons la récompense du gouvernement comme la somme d'un bénéfice et d'un coût d'intervention. Nous proposons un modèle qui décrit l'évolution de la stratégie de réallocation du gouvernement et étudions la stabilité de ses points d'équilibre.
The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.
Copier
Takafumi KANAZAWA, Hayato GOTO, Toshimitsu USHIO, "Replicator Dynamics with Dynamic Payoff Reallocation Based on the Government's Payoff" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E91-A, no. 9, pp. 2411-2418, September 2008, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.9.2411.
Abstract: In a population which consists of a large number of players interacting with each other, the payoff of each player often conflicts with the total payoff of the population which he/she belongs to. In such a situation, a "government" which has the comprehensive perspective is needed to govern the population. Recently, to discuss the population with the government, the authors have proposed replicator dynamics with reallocation of payoffs to analyze an effect of the government. In this model, the government is willing to lead the population to a desirable target state by collecting a part of players' payoffs and reallocating them depending on the target state. The government's action is the rate of collecting payoffs from players and the rate is assumed to be constant and independent of the population state. Thus, in this paper, we suppose that the government change their intervention strategy depending on the current population state. We consider the government as a game player and define the government's payoff as a sum of a benefit and a cost of intervention. We propose a model which describes the evolution of the government's reallocation strategy and investigate stability of its equilibrium points.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.9.2411/_p
Copier
@ARTICLE{e91-a_9_2411,
author={Takafumi KANAZAWA, Hayato GOTO, Toshimitsu USHIO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Replicator Dynamics with Dynamic Payoff Reallocation Based on the Government's Payoff},
year={2008},
volume={E91-A},
number={9},
pages={2411-2418},
abstract={In a population which consists of a large number of players interacting with each other, the payoff of each player often conflicts with the total payoff of the population which he/she belongs to. In such a situation, a "government" which has the comprehensive perspective is needed to govern the population. Recently, to discuss the population with the government, the authors have proposed replicator dynamics with reallocation of payoffs to analyze an effect of the government. In this model, the government is willing to lead the population to a desirable target state by collecting a part of players' payoffs and reallocating them depending on the target state. The government's action is the rate of collecting payoffs from players and the rate is assumed to be constant and independent of the population state. Thus, in this paper, we suppose that the government change their intervention strategy depending on the current population state. We consider the government as a game player and define the government's payoff as a sum of a benefit and a cost of intervention. We propose a model which describes the evolution of the government's reallocation strategy and investigate stability of its equilibrium points.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.9.2411},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={September},}
Copier
TY - JOUR
TI - Replicator Dynamics with Dynamic Payoff Reallocation Based on the Government's Payoff
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2411
EP - 2418
AU - Takafumi KANAZAWA
AU - Hayato GOTO
AU - Toshimitsu USHIO
PY - 2008
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.9.2411
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E91-A
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - September 2008
AB - In a population which consists of a large number of players interacting with each other, the payoff of each player often conflicts with the total payoff of the population which he/she belongs to. In such a situation, a "government" which has the comprehensive perspective is needed to govern the population. Recently, to discuss the population with the government, the authors have proposed replicator dynamics with reallocation of payoffs to analyze an effect of the government. In this model, the government is willing to lead the population to a desirable target state by collecting a part of players' payoffs and reallocating them depending on the target state. The government's action is the rate of collecting payoffs from players and the rate is assumed to be constant and independent of the population state. Thus, in this paper, we suppose that the government change their intervention strategy depending on the current population state. We consider the government as a game player and define the government's payoff as a sum of a benefit and a cost of intervention. We propose a model which describes the evolution of the government's reallocation strategy and investigate stability of its equilibrium points.
ER -