The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
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The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
Nous considérons les mesures incompatibles dans le protocole de distribution de clé quantique BB84, dans lequel les bases de mesure sont différentes des bases de transmission. Nous donnons une limite inférieure à la quantité de clé secrète pouvant être extraite des mesures incompatibles. Notre limite inférieure montre que nous pouvons extraire une clé secrète des mesures incompatibles avec certains canaux quantiques, comme le canal sur lequel la matrice Hadamard est appliquée à chaque qubit avec une forte probabilité. De plus, le principe d’incertitude entropique implique qu’on ne peut pas extraire simultanément la clé secrète des mesures correspondantes et des mesures incompatibles, lorsque nous utilisons la procédure standard de réconciliation des informations et d’amplification de la confidentialité.
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Ryutaroh MATSUMOTO, Shun WATANABE, "Key Rate Available from Mismatched Measurements in the BB84 Protocol and the Uncertainty Principle" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E91-A, no. 10, pp. 2870-2873, October 2008, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2870.
Abstract: We consider the mismatched measurements in the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, in which measuring bases are different from transmitting bases. We give a lower bound on the amount of a secret key that can be extracted from the mismatched measurements. Our lower bound shows that we can extract a secret key from the mismatched measurements with certain quantum channels, such as the channel over which the Hadamard matrix is applied to each qubit with high probability. Moreover, the entropic uncertainty principle implies that one cannot extract the secret key from both matched measurements and mismatched ones simultaneously, when we use the standard information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedure.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2870/_p
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@ARTICLE{e91-a_10_2870,
author={Ryutaroh MATSUMOTO, Shun WATANABE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Key Rate Available from Mismatched Measurements in the BB84 Protocol and the Uncertainty Principle},
year={2008},
volume={E91-A},
number={10},
pages={2870-2873},
abstract={We consider the mismatched measurements in the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, in which measuring bases are different from transmitting bases. We give a lower bound on the amount of a secret key that can be extracted from the mismatched measurements. Our lower bound shows that we can extract a secret key from the mismatched measurements with certain quantum channels, such as the channel over which the Hadamard matrix is applied to each qubit with high probability. Moreover, the entropic uncertainty principle implies that one cannot extract the secret key from both matched measurements and mismatched ones simultaneously, when we use the standard information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedure.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2870},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={October},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Key Rate Available from Mismatched Measurements in the BB84 Protocol and the Uncertainty Principle
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 2870
EP - 2873
AU - Ryutaroh MATSUMOTO
AU - Shun WATANABE
PY - 2008
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2870
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E91-A
IS - 10
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - October 2008
AB - We consider the mismatched measurements in the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, in which measuring bases are different from transmitting bases. We give a lower bound on the amount of a secret key that can be extracted from the mismatched measurements. Our lower bound shows that we can extract a secret key from the mismatched measurements with certain quantum channels, such as the channel over which the Hadamard matrix is applied to each qubit with high probability. Moreover, the entropic uncertainty principle implies that one cannot extract the secret key from both matched measurements and mismatched ones simultaneously, when we use the standard information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedure.
ER -